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Abstract
Background Whether patients in the vegetative state
(VS), minimally conscious state (MCS) or the clinically
related locked-in syndrome (LIS) should be kept alive is a
matter of intense controversy. This study aimed to exam-
ine themoral attitudes of lay people to these questions, and
the values and other factors that underlie these attitudes.
Method One hundred ninety-nine US residents com-
pleted a survey using the online platform Mechanical
Turk, comprising demographic questions, agreement
with treatment withdrawal from each of the condi-
tions, agreement with a series of ethical principles
and three personality tests.
Results More supported treatment withdrawal from
VS (40.2 % agreed, 17.6 % disagreed) than MCS
(20.6 %, 41.2 %) or LIS (25.3 %, 35.8 %). Agreement
with treatment withdrawal was negatively correlated
with religiosity (r=−0.272, P<0.001), though showed
no significant relationship with need for cognition
or empathy, and only a partial association with
utilitarian judgment in a standard moral dilemma.
Support for treatment withdrawal was most strongly
associated with endorsement of the importance of
patient autonomy, dignity, suffering, best interests.
Distributive justice was not given significant weight
by most. Importantly, agreement with treatment
withdrawal was noticeably higher when considered
from a first as opposed to third person perspective for
VS (Z=−6.056, P<0.001), MCS (Z=−6.746, P<0.001)
and LIS (Z=−6.681, P<0.001).
Conclusion Lay attitudes to withdrawal of treatment
in brain damaged patients are largely shaped by values
similar to those central to the secular ethical debate.
Neither traditional values such as the sanctity of life
nor utilitarian values relating to resource allocation
seem to play a central role. Far greater weight is given
to autonomy, which may explain why participants
were far more willing to endorse withdrawal of treat-
ment when the issue was presented in the first person,
or in relation to a concrete case involving a patient’s
explicit wishes. Surveys focusing on abstract cases
presented in the third person may not provide an
accurate picture of lay attitudes to these critical ethical
questions.
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Because of advances in modern medicine, patients are
increasingly surviving significant cognitive injury to
remain in states of diminished consciousness [1, 2].
Patients in these states–the vegetative state (VS) and
minimally conscious state (MCS) as well as in the
clinically related condition of locked-in syndrome
(LIS), where consciousness is unaffected–may be kept
alive almost indefinitely via the provision of artificial
nutrition and hydration. Whether patients in these
conditions should be kept alive in this way is, howev-
er, a matter of intense controversy. This study applies
the novel field of empirical ethics to provide a new
perspective on this discourse.
This issue has received extensive attention from
clinicians, legal experts, and ethicists; however, less
is known about the views of lay people. This is espe-
cially true of lay views about the MCS and LIS, which
are less familiar to the general public than the VS.
Although lay attitudes cannot decide these moral
issues, the degree to which the general public finds
withdrawal of treatment acceptable can affect the pros-
pects of policy in this direction.
The aim of the present study was to shed light on
attitudes to withdrawal of treatment from patients with
these forms of brain damage. Unlike most previous
studies, we focused here on the attitudes of lay people,
not of medical doctors or clinicians and explored the




VS describes patients with normal sleep-wake cycles
though no evidence of awareness of self or environ-
ment. Studies performed so far suggest that these
patients cannot feel pain [3–5]. No motor, sensory or
visual function is observed beyond reflexes [1]. De-
spite some controversy in the nomenclature, VS is
commonly termed permanent if it persists for longer
than 1 year following traumatic injury or 3 to 6 months
following anoxic events [5, 6]. Reports of extremely
rare late term recovery to higher states of conscious-
ness, however, have led to this qualifier often being
dropped.
MCS is similar to VS, though with partial preser-
vation of awareness at drastically reduced levels.
Patients may inconsistently be capable of simple
command-following, “yes/no” responses, verbalisa-
tion or purposeful behaviour. Similar brain activation
to healthy controls has been shown in response to
painful [7, 8] and emotional [9] stimuli, though exact
levels of awareness are unknown. The prognosis in
MCS is more varied and slightly better than in VS,
though recovery is rare and usually to states with
permanent, multiple and severe disabilities [10].
LIS is not a disorder of consciousness as patients in
this condition retain normal cognitive capacities. It
does, however, have a similar clinical presentation to
genuine disorders of consciousness as LIS patients are
completely paralysed and unable to speak or move.
Most are able to communicate through eye movements
[11] though some lack even this capacity; this condi-
tion is termed total-LIS. Though discussed mostly as a
theoretical possibility, cases have been reported in
which clinicians have relied on EEGs to provide evi-
dence for normal consciousness in totally unrespon-
sive patients [12]. Whether these represent true cases
of total-LIS, however, is unclear.
Legality of Treatment Withdrawal
Despite remaining publicly controversial, over the past
decades the legality of withdrawal of treatment from
patients in the VS has been confirmed in the US [13],
UK [14] and Australia [15]. This is not currently the
case for the more recent diagnosis of MCS. In the
court case W v. M, believed to be the first of its kind
in Britain, a family’s application to have treatment
withdrawn from a woman in MCS was refused. This
verdict has been strongly criticised, due to the ruling’s
perceived contradiction of M’s desires while still com-
petent. These were evidenced by numerous comments
that she did not want “a life dependent on others” and
would prefer to “go quickly” [16].
Previous Studies of Moral Attitudes
A number of surveys have been undertaken to ascer-
tain the opinions of healthcare professionals towards
withdrawal of treatment. These have mostly focused
on the VS and have shown majority support for with-
drawal of treatment in this condition: levels of support
of 66–89 % for withdrawal of treatment from VS
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patients have been reported amongst healthcare pro-
fessionals in the US and Europe [17–19]. Some stud-
ies have shown that age and religion as well as
geographical location (south vs. north Europe) can
affect the proportion in favour of withdrawal of treat-
ment [20]. Withdrawal of treatment from MCS enjoys
far less support. One study found that only 28 % of
healthcare professionals supported withdrawal of
treatment in MCS compared with 66 % in VS [19].
In several studies, however, a higher proportion of
respondents were willing to choose withdrawal of
treatment for themselves than were willing to endorse
it as a general policy [19, 21].
Despite surveys as to the views of healthcare pro-
fessionals, little is known about the views of lay peo-
ple or the values and underlying factors associated
with these beliefs. It is similarly unknown whether
the trends found in medical professionals–the propen-
sity for older, more religious physicians to reject with-
drawal of treatment; a greater desire to have treatment
withdrawn from themselves than to endorse it as a
general policy–continue in laypeople.
Hypotheses
We hypothesised that support would be stronger for
withdrawal of treatment from the VS and total-LIS
than from the MCS or LIS. We also predicted that
support for withdrawal of treatment would be higher
(a) when the scenario is considered from a first as
opposed to third person perspective (b) in those with
a lower self-reported religiosity (c) in those who adop-
ted a utilitarian solution to a much studied moral
dilemma, “the Footbridge Dilemma” and (d) in those
with a higher need for cognition, a standard measure
of a motivational tendency to prefer effortful cognition
to intuition and gut reaction.
Methods
An online platform, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, was
used to recruit US residents to complete a question-
naire comprising attitudes towards withdrawal of treat-
ment, demographic information–age, gender, religion
and religiosity–and the Need for Cognition Scale. In
order to gain further data on the personality traits that
may underlie attitudes to withdrawal of treatment, we
also asked participants to take the Big Five Inventory (a
general measure of personality) and the Interpersonal
Reactivity Index (a standard measure of empathy).
Participants were introduced to the four clinical
conditions by descriptions based on clinical guide-
lines, screened by a neurologist for accuracy. The
names of these conditions were substituted for awak-
edness without awareness, minimal awareness, near
complete paralysis and complete paralysis to reduce
jargon and the effect of connotations associated with
‘vegetative’.
Participants responded to 23 questions relating to
withdrawal of treatment. This questionnaire was based
in part on previous studies, but includes a range of new
questions aiming tomeasure ethical issues not examined
by prior research. A 7-point Likert scale was employed
to allow participants space to express uncertainty about
ethical issues that are complex and difficult.
Participants were first asked to indicate their level
of endorsement of the statements: “It is morally ac-
ceptable to end the patient’s life by stopping treatment
in [each of the conditions]” and “I would want to be
kept alive if I were in [each of the conditions]”.
Then, participants indicated the importance of the
following factors in each these decisions: avoidance of
suffering, religious beliefs, sanctity of life, dignity,
quality of life, interests of family, good of society
and the amount of medical resources treatment
requires. They also rated the importance of autonomy,
best interests, distributive justice, the sanctity of life,
the best interests of a patient’s family and their reli-
gious beliefs in making withdrawal of treatment deci-
sions in general.
The British legal case of W v. M was then briefly
described in the form of a short vignette and partic-
ipants were asked whether withdrawal of treatment
was ethical in this particular case.
Finally, participants responded to a widely studied
thought experiment, the Footbridge Dilemma. In this
dilemma, participants are asked whether it is ethical to
push a bystander off a bridge into the path of an
oncoming vehicle in order to stop it hurtling towards
and killing five others. Responses to this dilemma thus
offer a measure of whether individuals favour a ‘util-
itarian’ or ‘deontological’ approach to hypothetical
life and death decisions, enabling us to investigate
here whether support for withdrawal of treatment
reflects a more general utilitarian tendency.
Quality of responses was ensured by limiting ac-
cess to the survey to those who had previously
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completed at least 95 % of their previous Mechanical
Turk tasks correctly and by including an ‘instructional
manipulation check’.1
Data was processed using SPSS. The seven-point
Likert scale was simplified to a categorical answer in
response to attitudes towards withdrawal of treatment
by assigning a score of 1–2 as agreement, 6–7 as
disagreement and 3–5 as having no strong opinion to
determine prevalence of agreement with withdrawal of
treatment from each of the conditions.
Correlations between agreement with withdrawal of
treatment and predictor variables such as religiosity,
performance on personality tests, decision in the Foot-
bridge Dilemma and endorsement of a series of ethical
principles was calculated using the Pearson Correlation
Co-efficient. Friedman Two Way Analysis of Variance
and Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests were used to deter-
mine significance of differences in the case of each
variable. Results were considered significant at P<0.05.
Ethics
Ethics approval was obtained from the University of
Oxford Social Sciences and Humanities Inter-Divisional
Research Ethics Committee and the Monash University
Human Research Ethics Committee. Participation was
anonymous, voluntary and restricted to those over the
age of 18.
Results
Two hundred forty-one valid responses were received
of which 42 were excluded for failing the ‘instruction-
al manipulation check’ (see above), leaving a study
sample of 199. The mean completion time of the
survey was 20 min and 30 s.
Support for withdrawal of treatment from VS and
total-LIS was higher than MCS or LIS (Table 1). There
was a marked difference between the levels of support
for withdrawal of treatment when considered from a first
and third person perspective (Table 2). Wilcoxon signed
rank tests showed participants were more likely to want
treatment removed from themselves than to endorse it in
general in VS (Z=−6.056, P<0.001), MCS (Z=−6.746,
P<0.001), LIS (Z=−6.681, P<0.001) and total LIS
(Z=−5.740, P<0.001).
The presence of consciousness was considered the
most important factor in withdrawal of treatment deci-
sions, followed by considerations of autonomy and the
ability to interact with others. Considerations of reli-
gion, the sanctity of life and longevity of the patient
were considered least important. In terms of the prin-
ciples set out by Beauchamp and Childress, autonomy
was considered more important than best interests and
much more than distributive justice (Table 3).
Considerations of distributive justice, autonomy, best
interests and the patient’s suffering, dignity and quality of
life were positively correlated with endorsement of with-
drawal of treatment. Religiosity and endorsement of the
sanctity of life were negatively correlated (Table 4). Older
subjects were more strongly opposed to withdrawal of
treatment, but only from total-LIS (r=−0.145, P=0.041).
1 An instructional manipulation check allows researchers to
identify participants who are not actively engaging with a ques-
tionnaire. A paragraph telling participants to select a non-
obvious response is followed by a question with a seemingly
obvious answer. Those who selected the seemingly obvious
answer showed themselves to be skipping instructions and so
were excluded from the survey. These have been shown to
increase the validity of responses [22].
Table 1 Responses to question ‘it is morally acceptable to end





VS 40.2 % 42.2 % 17.6 %
MCS 20.6 % 38.2 % 41.2 %
LIS 25.3 % 38.9 % 35.8 %
Total-LIS 35.2 % 38.2 % 26.6 %
Here, a score of 1 or 2 on the Likert scale was defined as
agreement, 3–5 as unsure or no strong opinion and 6 or 7 as
disagreement
Table 2 Responses to question ‘I would want treatment with-




VS 64.2 % 21.7 % 14.1 %
MCS 41.4 % 36.4 % 22.2 %
LIS 35.8 % 38.9 % 25.3 %
Total-LIS 55.8 % 27.1 % 17.1 %
Here, a score of 1 or 2 on the Likert scale was defined as
agreement, 3–5 as unsure or no strong opinion and 6 or 7 as
disagreement
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Forty-seven percent disagreed with the courts decision
against withdrawal of treatment in W v. M, more than
twice the 22.8 % who agreed with it (Table 5). Support
for withdrawal of treatment in this case was inversely
correlated with religiosity (r=0.288, P>0.001).
There were 76.9 % of the participants rejected the
utilitarian solution to the Footbridge Dilemma. Older
respondents were less likely to agree with a utilitarian
decision in this case. There was no correlation between
responses to the Footbridge Dilemma and religiosity or
the personality traits wemeasured (Table 6). Interestingly,
and only partly in line with our hypothesis, endorsement
of the utilitarian solution was correlated with endorse-
ment of withdrawal of treatment in MCS (r=.220, P=
0.002), LIS (r=0.199, P=0.005) and total-LIS (r=0.139,
P=0.050) but not in VS (r=−0.007, P=0.923).
Contrary to our hypothesis, higher ‘need for cogni-
tion’ wasn’t generally correlated with greater endorse-
ment of withdrawal of treatment, nor, contrary to some
prior studies, was it correlated with utilitarian responses
to the Footbridge Dilemma. Those with a higher need
for cognition were less likely to want withdrawal of
treatment from themselves in LIS (r=−0.184, P=
0.015), though not in any other condition. They were
also less likely to endorse distributive justice in with-
drawal of treatment decisions (r=−0.234, P=0.002).
There was no correlation between scores on the inter-
personal reactivity index and withdrawal of treatment in
any of the four cases or with decisions in the Footbridge
Dilemma.
Discussion
We found that lay attitudes towards withdrawal of
treatment differ depending on individuals’ religiosity
Table 3 Endorsement of factors important in withdrawal of
treatment decisions 1 = not at all important… 7 = very important
Values/factors Mean Median
Autonomy 6.18 7
Best interests 5.72 6
Distributive justice 3.82 4
Sanctity of life 3.19 3
Best interests of family 4.24 5
Religion 3.22 3
Presence of consciousness 6.59 7
Avoidance of suffering 5.83 6
Dignity 5.82 6
Ability to interact with others 6.10 7
Longevity 2.20 1
Table 4 Endorsement of factors correlated with endorsement of








Distributive justice 0.455 <0.001
Patient suffering 0.415 <0.001
Dignity 0.470 <0.001
Quality of life 0.565 <0.001
Autonomy 0.328 <0.001
Best interests 0.236 0.001
Negative correlation
Religiosity −0.272 <0.001
Sanctity of life −0.519 <0.001
No correlation
Best interests of family 0.088 0.219
Table 5 Responses to question ‘should treatment be stopped [in
case of M]’
Agree 47.0 %
Unsure/no strong opinion 30.3 %
Disagree 22.7 %
Here, a score of 1 or 2 on the Likert scale was defined as agreement,
3–5 as unsure or no strong opinion and 6 or 7 as disagreement
Table 6 Endorsement of factors in withdrawal of treatment









Distributive justice 0.208 0.003
Patient suffering 0.150 0.036
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and values. They do not, however, appear to be asso-
ciated with underlying personality traits. Withdrawal
of treatment is seen as more acceptable for patients in
VS or total-LIS than LIS or MCS, though there is a
large amount of variability in attitudes. In line with
previous research, individuals are more likely to want
treatment withdrawn from themselves than endorse
withdrawal of treatment more generally.
Attitudes Towards Withdrawal of Treatment
At first, our results appear discordant with previous
surveys, which have shown much higher levels of
support for withdrawal of treatment from VS. Surveys
done in the US found levels as high as 80–89 % [17,
18], compared with 40.2 % found here. This seems
largely due to methodological differences. Previous
surveys relied on a forced yes/no dichotomy, unlike
the Likert scale used here, where participants were
given the option of indicating that they were unsure.
One striking finding is that when people are given this
option, a large proportion, approximately 40 %, select
it in each case. Clearly there is a lot of uncertainty that
has been somewhat obscured by the methodology of
prior studies. It is likely that this indecision reflects
hesitancy endorsing or rejecting withdrawal of treat-
ment categorically and is a recognition that it may be
appropriate in some instances though not all. This
view is supported by the lower level of uncertainty
(30 %) when withdrawal of treatment is considered in
the single case of W v. M. Furthermore, previous
studies directly referenced the vegetative and minimal-
ly conscious states by their proper names, unlike the
substituted names used here.
A slightly lower level of support for withdrawal of
treatment may also be explained by different demograph-
ics. Previous research concerned medical professionals
who presumably havemuch greater familiarity with with-
drawal of treatment. For these professionals, even hypo-
thetical cases are therefore more real and vivid which
may be a factor leading to greater acceptance. A previous
study, including both physicians and paramedical profes-
sionals, found 66 % in agreement [19], lower than the
89 % of physicians quoted above. Greater unwillingness
to withdraw treatment as we move from physicians to lay
people does therefore seem to be a consistent finding.
The higher level of support when withdrawal of
treatment is considered from the first as opposed to
third person perspective confirmed one of our
hypotheses and reflects previous research [19, 23]. In
each case a large proportion were still uncertain about
the morality of withdrawal of treatment, though this
proportion halved when withdrawal of treatment was
considered from the first person perspective in the case of
VS. This was not the case for MCS, where the proportion
who were unsure remained steady. The proportion who
rejected withdrawal of treatment in this case, however,
halved, while those who supported it doubled. It does
therefore seem that when withdrawal of treatment is
considered from this perspective there is a movement of
most along the spectrum from rejection to support.
This difference may also be due to order effects.
Participants were first asked whether withdrawal of
treatment is ethically acceptable, and only then wheth-
er they would want it in their own case. The latter is
less abstract and more vivid, which may have led to
participants reaching different moral conclusions.
In any event, since it is unlikely that participants both
wanted withdrawal of treatment in their own case and
thought that withdrawal of treatment is ethically wrong
even when such wishes have been expressed, we can
conclude that lay people accept the permissibility of
withdrawal of treatment in brain damaged patients to
much higher levels than is revealed by direct question-
ing, though they may still have reservations about
accepting withdrawal of treatment as a general policy.
W v. M
Our results suggest that common criticism of this legal
decision is in line with the moral attitudes of lay
people. More than twice the number of respondents
supported withdrawal of treatment in this case than
rejected it. This could, however, represent a cultural
difference given that the US, from which we drew our
sample, bases court decisions on autonomy via a sub-
stituted decision rather than best interests using a
balance sheet approach as in the UK.
Interestingly, a much higher proportion endorsed
withdrawal of treatment in the case of M (47 %) than
from MCS in general (20.6 %). Importantly, this may
indicate that, even though some personally disagree with
withdrawal of treatment, the strong consensus about the
importance of autonomy requires that they accept it so
long as it directly reflects the patient’s wishes. The hes-
itancy to endorse withdrawal of treatment more generally
may therefore be an indication that the current safeguards
to ensure decisions are autonomous are seen to be
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inadequate or indeed that lay people are ignorant of those
safeguards that presently exist. Clearly the role of ad-
vance directives and other devices in upholding patient
autonomy need to be emphasised.
The much higher rate of support for withdrawal of
treatment in the case of W v. M than for MCS more
generally also supports our suggestion that agreement
with withdrawal of treatment increases when the con-
dition is considered more vividly, and not just from a
first as opposed to third person perspective.
Correlates of Endorsement of Withdrawal of Treatment
Unsurprisingly, given traditional antagonism towards
withdrawal of treatment from religious quarters, we
found an inverse correlation between religiosity and
agreement with withdrawal of treatment.
This indicates that there is a strong religious compo-
nent to some opposition to withdrawal of treatment in
these conditions. Given the potential for public opinion to
shape public policy, religiously motivated moral beliefs
may legitimately be questioned when they impact on
secular society. Religiouslymotivated opposition towith-
drawal of treatment may therefore be given less weight.
It is not surprising that different principles and frames
of references are associated with support and opposition
to withdrawal of treatment. It is unclear, however, wheth-
er the values endorsed by participants shape the ethical
decisions they make, or were endorsed as later ration-
alisations for moral beliefs they held independently, per-
haps on an intuitive or emotional basis. If the former is
correct, then these results suggest that attempts to pro-
mote the acceptance of withdrawal of treatment should
emphasise the importance of the principles of distribu-
tive justice, autonomy and best interests and considera-
tions of the patient’s suffering, dignity and quality of
life–all of which are factors positively correlated with
increased acceptance of withdrawal of treatment.
Personality Traits
The personality traits that we measured did not have a
strong or consistent effect on moral attitudes. Other
factors, such as a person’s religiosity or the values they
endorse as being important in decision-making appear
to have a much greater role in shaping ethical beliefs.
This suggests that ethical values are not mere artefacts
of personality traits and instead represent genuine
personal dimensions that are capable of influencing
decision making. Interestingly, higher need for cogni-
tion wasn’t correlated with greater endorsement of
withdrawal of treatment, suggesting that opposition
to withdrawal of treatment isn’t based on mere gut
responses or intuition and that, conversely, support for
withdrawal of treatment isn’t necessarily based on
greater degrees of critical moral reflection.
Values Associated with Support for and Opposition
to Withdrawal of Treatment
Several factors, such as autonomy and the presence of
consciousness have very broad appeal as significant
factors in moral decision making.
The low level of endorsement of distributive justice
as an important factor in attitudes to withdrawal of
treatment is significant given the pre-eminence of
considerations of justice in contemporary bioethics.
This could reflect an inability to take account of the
wider societal impacts of treatment decisions or, alter-
natively, unwillingness to place a price on life.
The latter interpretation is congruent with our results
in the Footbridge Dilemma. 76.9 % rejected a utilitarian
solution to this dilemma. This figure is broadly in line
with prior research, though some studies reported higher
rates of non-utilitarian responses [24].
This result suggests lay people reject utilitarian
cost-benefit analyses as an appropriate consideration
in life and death decisions, both in the context of
hypothetical dilemmas such as the Footbridge Dilem-
ma as well as in real life medical cases relating to
withdrawal of treatment in brain damaged patients.
This represents a departure from the views of a num-
ber of medical and ethical experts [25, 26]. For in-
stance, Jennett, one of the first to describe VS,
believes we “certainly should question the utilisation
of precious resources [for treatment of disorders of
consciousness]” and that we “can no longer afford
the luxury of always doing everything for every pa-
tient” [27]. Our findings suggest that emphasis on
such considerations is unlikely to have much sway
on popular opinions about withdrawal of treatment.
Conclusion
The present study was novel in its focus on the moral
views of lay people, as opposed to healthcare profes-
sionals, and also in its examination of the underlying
factors that may affect these views.
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Here, we found that, though opposition to withdrawal
of treatment in the cases of MCS and LIS appears
significant, its strength and nature are open to question.
This is highlighted by the increased proportion in favour
of withdrawal of treatment when considered in concrete
cases, such as that of W v. M, or from a first rather than
third person perspective. This suggests that support (or
at least acceptance) of withdrawal of treatment is con-
siderably stronger than suggested by prior surveys,
though comparisons are difficult due to the large number
of unsure participants.
Support for withdrawal of treatment was most
strongly associated with endorsement of the impor-
tance of patient autonomy, dignity, suffering, best
interests and distributive justice. Emphasising the im-
portance of these values may lead to increased accep-
tance of withdrawal of treatment. Importantly,
considerations of distributive justice were not rated
as important by many respondents, nor was a utilitar-
ian solution generally supported in the Footbridge
Dilemma. This suggests that a majority rejects utilitar-
ian cost-benefit analyses in life and death decisions.
The lack of association between personality measures
and endorsement of both withdrawal of treatment and
different ethical values indicates that moral beliefs are
not reducible to personality traits.
This study has several limitations. People may not
always have accurate introspective access to the fac-
tors that really drive their moral views, and it is diffi-
cult to convey complex clinical and ethical notions in
a survey form. A move to focus groups may therefore
provide an important source of further evidence about
lay attitudes to withdrawal of treatment. Another in-
herent limitation to this sort of cross-sectional study
design is the inability to establish a temporal rela-
tionship and therefore causality. Therefore, there is
no way of knowing whether the values participants
considered important in decision-making are the
foundations of those decisions or simply rationali-
sations of them.
One issue that seems urgent to clarify is the appar-
ent inconsistencies in opposition to withdrawal of
treatment. This is evident in the gap between first
and third person judgement in these decisions and also
in the much higher rate of endorsement of withdrawal
of treatment in the W v. M case than in MCS gener-
ally. Future research should elucidate how people jus-
tify these discrepancies, which this study cannot fully
resolve.
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